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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Except for the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Moresi v.
State of Louisiana, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,' noted in
this symposium last year,2 Louisiana appellate courts have during the
past term issued few decisions significantly adding to previous inter-
pretations of the individual rights elements of the Louisiana Declaration
of Rights. Nevertheless, the Louisiana courts did issue several note-
worthy decisions further articulating the relationship between the some-
times competing state constitutional rights of disclosure of public
documents and individual privacy, and several other noteworthy cases
involving other state constitutional rights.
Delineating the Boundary Between the Right of Privacy and the
Public's Right to Know
During the past year, Louisiana appellate courts continued to ad-
dress a number of problems arising out of the state constitution's
guarantee of the public's limited right to "examine public documents." 3
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1. 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990). In Moresi, the supreme court held that infringement
of the guarantee of "privacy" in article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974 may give rise to a cause of action for damages, similar to those direct constitutional
tort actions recognized under the federal Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). In
addition, the Moresi court also stated, in dictum, that the protections of section 5 go
beyond limiting state action and apply directly to protect against invasions of privacy
by at least some private, non-governmental infringers. 567 So. 2d at 1092-93.
2. Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law. 1989-1990,
51 La. L. Rev. 295, 305-06 (1990).
3. La. Const. art. XII, § 3 provides as follows:
Right to Direct Participation
No Person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations of public
bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by law.
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The courts construed both the Louisiana Constitution' and the Public
Records Act,' the statute enacted to carry out the constitutional com-
mand, to expand the category of entities subject to disclosure and
further define the statutory exceptions to disclosure.6 Though each one
is different in its specifics, each case required the court to balance,
explicitly or implicitly, two competing constitutional values: the public's
right to know and the individual's right of privacy. Taken together,
they demonstrate the continuance and strengthening of two trends:
first, expansion of the categories of entities subject to the Act and
records subject to disclosure under the Act; and second, effective
convergence of the statutory and state constitutional standards for
exemption from disclosure on a single inquiry, i.e. the question of
whether the subject of the disclosure has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" with respect to the information at issue.
Expanding the Definition of Entities Subject to Disclosure:
Guste v. Nicholls College Foundation
The Nicholls College Foundation is a nonprofit corporation or-
ganized to foster and promote the welfare of Nicholls State University.
4. La. Const. art. I, § 5 provides for an individual right of privacy, as follows:
Section 5. Right to Privacy
Every person shall be secure in his person, property communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
La. Const. art. XII, § 3 provides a right of access to public records, as follows:
Sec. 3. Right to Direct Participation
Section 3. No person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations
of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established
by law.
5. La. R.S. 44:1 et seq. (1982).
6. One additional case, Cummings v. Kempf, 570 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1990), reaffirmed the impropriety. of placing unnecessary financial or procedural res-
trictions on access to records. The case involved a title abstractor who wanted to install
its own copy machine at the office of the parish clerk of court. The trial court granted
the abstractor the right to install the machine, but only under onerous conditions,
including having the work supervised by the clerk or one of her employees and paying
S.25 per page as a supervisory fee. Relying upon the supreme court's decision in Title
Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So. 2d 933 (La. 1984), the court of appeal modified
the trial court's order, eliminating both the requirement of direct supervision and the
accompanying fee. Other conditions, including that the abstractor work only during
normal office hours, that he purchase a $300,000 insurance policy, and that he pay a
small monthly fee for the electricity used, were upheld.
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In Guste v. Nicholls College Foundation,' the state supreme court did
not conclude whether the Foundation constituted a "public body"
under the meaning of the Public Records Act,' but nonetheless found
that the Foundation's books were "public records" partially subject
to inspection under that Act. The court so found solely because the
Foundation received money from the Nicholls State University Alumni
Federation, an entity clearly subject to the Act. 9 The Court reasoned
that because the Alumni Federation was a "public body" under the
meaning of the Public Records Act,' 0 money donated by the Alumni
Federation to the Foundation therefore constituted "public funds"
under the meaning of that Act." Since the state constitution generally
prohibits the donation of public funds to any other person or body, 12
7. 564 So. 2d 682 (La. 1990).
8. Id. at 687. The Public Records Law defines a "public body" to include "a
public or quasi-public nonprofit corporation designated as an entity to perform a
governmental or proprietary function." La. R.S. 44:1(A)(1) (1982).
9. In addition to authorizing inspection of government records per se, the Louisiana
Public Records Act, La. R.S. 44:1 et seq., allows the inspection, reproduction or
obtaining of reproductions of any "public record" in the hands of any party. Public
records include all books and records: (a) used in the transaction of business "performed
by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state, or by or under the
authority of any ordinance, regulation, mandate, or order of any public body;" or (b)
"concerning the receipt or payment of any money received or paid by or under the
authority of the constitution or the laws of this state." La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2) (1982).
10. The supreme court held that the Alumni Federation was a "public body"
because of its close relationship with the state-supported Nicholls State University. The
Federation was staffed by state civil service employees, and paid only "nominal" rent
for its office in a public building on campus. Its workers were paid through the university
budget, and its stated purpose in its articles of incorporation is to "promote the
University." The court concluded that the Federation was therefore a "'quasi-public'
nonprofit corporation designated as an entity to perform a governmental or proprietary
function," and subject to the Public Records Act. Guste, 564 So. 2d at 687, quoting
La. R.S. 44:1(A)(1) (1982).
11. The Nicholls State University Alumni Federation received a portion of its funds
from a "student self-assessment" fee of $1.35 per semester, which all students were
required to pay at registration. In 1984, the Board of Directors of the Alumni Federation
decided to donate 10% of the student generated funds to the Foundation. Guste, 564
So. 2d at 684. The court concluded that these funds constituted "public funds" under
the meaning of the Public Records Law because they were part of the mandatory tuition
and fees collected from all students at Nicholls State University. See Carter v. Fench,
322 So. 2d 305 (La. App. I Cir. 1975), writ denied, 325 So. 2d 277 (1976) (holding
that tuition fees paid to Southern University are public funds and that since a portion
of the funds were allocated to the Student Government Association, the financial records
of the S.G.A. were subject to public inspection). All recipients of such funds, "whether
they be governmental, public or private bodies, are subject to the Public Records Law
insofar as their financial records are concerned." Guste, 564 So. 2d at 687, quoting
Carter, 322 So. 2d at 307.
12. La. Const. art. VII, § 14(A) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1992]
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the Foundation's receipt of such funds from the Alumni Federation
would be permissible only if the transfer of funds from the Alumni
Federation to the Foundation was in furtherance of their shared purpose
of promoting Nicholls State University.' 3 Finding that the transfer of
funds was properly made and received for the purpose of furthering
public education, the court concluded that the money was therefore
"given and accepted 'under the authority of the constitution and laws
of the state' in furtherance of a governmental purpose" under the
meaning of the Public Records Act, 4 and that the Foundation could
therefore be required to open its books for inspection to the extent
that those books reflected the receipt and expenditure of those funds. 5
The Foundation argued that the court's holding would open to
public scrutiny the books of all persons, organizations, or corporations
who receive even small amounts of money from the state, and that
this result would serve to discourage such cooperative ventures. While
this prediction of dire consequences may be overstated, it does appear
that the Nicholls decision will significantly increase the range of entities
subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. The supreme court
appeared quite willing to accept this consequence, reaffirming once
again that, except where countervailing rights of privacy are at issue,
Donation, Loan, or Pledge of Public Credit
(A) Prohibited Uses. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the
funds, credit, property or things of value of the state or of any political
subdivision shall not be loaned, pledged, or donated to or for any person,
association, or corporation, public or private.
13. The court drew a distinction between "donation" of public funds, an action
which is prohibited by the state constitution, and the "transfer" of such funds from
a public body to another body, when given and accepted for the purpose of furthering
the transferor public body's designated functions, which is not prohibited. La. Const.
art. VII, § 14(B) contains a list of "authorized uses" for which public funds can be
donated, none of which appears to apply to the situation at Nicholls State University.
The court's construction of the constitutional term "donation" as not including "trans-
fers" in furtherance of shared purposes follows current developments in this and other
states, the general tendency of which has been to loosen restraints on the mechanisms
by which public bodies may use public funds for public purposes. See, e.g., L. Hargrave,
The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 130-31 (1991). Nonetheless, unless
limited by future cases, this construction may create an expansive exception to the
constitutional prohibition of La. Const. art. VII, § 14.
14. Guste v. Nicholls College Foundation, 564 So. 2d 682, 688 (La. 1990). Justice
Cole dissented on this point, arguing that the Foundation had no legal or constitutional
responsibility to do anything. Id. at 689.
15. The case came to the supreme court as an appeal from the grant of the
Foundation's motion for a directed verdict. In reversing and remanding for further
proceedings, the supreme court did not conclusively hold that the Attorney General had
carried his burden of showing that the records at issue were subject to the Public
Records Law. It did, however, go out of its way to indicate a view that the law and
facts appeared to favor such a result. Id. at 689.
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"the law favors a liberal construction of the public records law 'so
as to enlarge rather than restrict access to public records by the
public."" ' 6 Moreover, because the right of inspection recognized in
Nicholls extended only to the records of receipts and expenditures of
public funds, an entity wishing to preserve its confidentiality need only
maintain "separate and distinct books, accounts and records" in order
to avoid disclosing nonpublic receipts and expenditures.' 7
Drawing the Line Between Disclosure and Privacy: Treadway;
Harrison; Hatfield; Marine Shale and the "Reasonable Expectation"
Standard
Given the breadth of the supreme court's definition of the entities
subject to the Public Records Act and the even broader definition of
"public records" contained within that Act," it is clear that the real
issue which will determine the effective limits of disclosure will continue
to be the scope given to the exceptions to disclosure expressed in the
Public Records Act' 9 and implicit in the individual's countervailing
right of privacy.20 As articulated by the courts of appeal, analysis of
these exceptions to disclosure purports to involve separate statutory
and constitutional inquiries:
16. Guste, 564 So. 2d at 686-87, citing Lewis v. Spurney, 456 So. 2d 206 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 457 So. 2d 1183 (1984) and 458 So. 2d 488 (1984) (financial
records of the Louisiana World Exposition subject to examination from the date it
began to receive state funds); Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 366 So. 2d 564 (1979) (finding a privacy-based exception to the broad rule
of disclosure to protect confidential job evaluations of government employees); and
Amoco Production Co. v. Landry, 426 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
433 So. 2d 164 (1983) (distinguishing Trahan and finding no right to privacy preventing
disclosure of records of disciplinary hearings of the Board of Professional Engineers
and Land Surveyors).
17. Gusle, 564 So. 2d at 689.
18. La. R.S. 44:1 A(2) (1982) defines the "public records" subject to disclosure
to include "[a]ll books, records, writings, accounts, letters ... and papers."
19. The Public Records Act contains general provisions excepting certain records
from disclosure even if they would otherwise fall within the broadly defined category
of "public records." See, e.g., La. R.S. 44:2 (1982) (legislative investigations); La. R.S.
44:3 (1982) (records of prosecutive, investigatory and law enforcement agencies); La.
R.S. 44:4 (1982) (tax returns and certain records pertaining to welfare payments, li-
quidation proceedings, banks, insurance ratings, licensing proceedings, oil and gas re-
serves, or the like); La. R.S. 44:5 (1982) (records in the hands of the governor); La.
R.S. 44:7 (1982) (hospital records); La. R.S. 44:11 (1982) (certain personnel records);
La. R.S. 44:12 (1982) (medical records of employees covered by State Employees Group
Benefits Program); and La. R.S. 44:13 (Supp. 1991) (library records).
20. La. Const. art. I, § 5, quoted supra at note 4. The state constitutional right
of "privacy" in this sense, as a guarantee against unwarranted disclosure of personal
information, was recognized in Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
1978), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 564 (1979).
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Initially, we must determine if the privacy exceptions set forth
in La.R.S. 44:11 apply.. If this statute applies, that is the end
of the inquiry. [If not, the issue of constitutional privacy must
be addressed.] First, it must be determined whether the public
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy against dis-
closure of the pertinent information. If there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy, that is the end of the inquiry. If a
reasonable expectation of privacy is found, we then must bal-
ance the public's right to disclosure against the .... right to
privacy. 2
During the last term, the Louisiana courts of appeal continued to
struggle with questions of how these standards should be applied in
several differing factual settings.
In most cases the courts continued both to broadly define "public
records" and to narrowly construe the statutory exceptions to public
access, thus authorizing the broadest possible availability of infor-
mation. Thus in Treadway v. Jones,2 2 the fourth circuit ruled that
proposals written for the purpose of obtaining contracts to manage
housing projects for the Housing Authority of New Orleans constituted
"public records" under the meaning of the statute, that the parties
who had submitted them had no "expectation of privacy" as to their
content2 4 and that a mere recommendation by the federal Department
of Housing and Urban Development that such proposals should remain
confidential was not sufficient to preempt state law mandating disclo-
sure.2" Similarly, in Hatfield v. Bush,26 the first circuit held that the
21. Hatfield v. Bush, 572 So. 2d 588, 592-93 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), citing
Gannett River States Publishing v. Hussey, 557 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 561 So. 2d 103 (1990).
22. 583 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). There was no dispute that HANO
is a "public body," or that its records are therefore subject to disclosure unless protected
by some constitutional right or statutory exemption. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(1) (1982).
23. Treadway, 583 So. 2d at 121, quoting the very broadly phrased definition of
"public records" found in La.. R.S. 44:32 D (1982).
24. Treadway, 583 So. 2d at 121. The court relied on Gannett, 557 So. 2d at 1154,
which applied a balancing test resulting in the finding that individuals applying for
appointment as the Fire Chief of Shreveport had "no legitimate expectation of privacy"
which would prevent disclosure of records relating to the process by which the Fire
Chief was selected.
25. The court examined whether that state public disclosure law was preempted by
federal statutes or regulations, which had to be considered because HANO operates
under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
HANO cited no federal regulations or laws which ban disclosure of these management
proposals; HUD officials had recommended that these proposals remain confidential.
However, the court ruled that such a recommendation was not sufficient: "HANO's
[Vol. 52
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leave records of a parish district attorney's employees were public
records subject to disclosure," that they did not fall within the category
of "certain personnel records" specially exempted from disclosure by
statute," and that public employees have no reasonable expectation of
privacy that would preclude disclosure of their names or the dates and
reasons for their absences.29 Additionally, in Harrison v. Norris,30 the
second circuit held that the statutory exemption from disclosure of
"[riecords pertaining to pending criminal litigation .. ."I' could not
be invoked to prevent a convicted felon applying for post-conviction
relief from examining the prosecution records on which the State relied
in seeking his conviction) 2
desire to defer to HUD's preference does not justify HANO's refusal to produce the
proposals." Treadway, 583 So. 2d at 122.
26. 572 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991). The case involved the request of
members of the news media to inspect the leave records of some of the employees of
the District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish.
27. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2) (1982) defines "public records" subject to disclosure broadly
to include:
All records, . . . and papers .... having been used, . . . or prepared, possessed,
or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business,
transaction, work, duty or function which was conducted, transacted, or
performed ... by or under the authority of any ... order of any public
body . . . are "public records" .....
The court in Hatfield concluded that the leave records at issue fell within this definition
because the district attorney is an instrumentality of the state government, and because
the leave records were used in the conduct of state business in the district attorney's
office. 572 So. 2d at 592.
28. La. R.S. 44:11 (1982). By its terms, the statute exempts only home telephone
numbers of public employees.
29. As set out by the first circuit, the analysis is a two-step process. First the
court must determine whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to the information sought. If not, the inquiry ends; if so, the
court must balance the public's right to know against the -individual's privacy interest.
Hatfield, 572 So. 2d at 592-93, citing Gannett, 557 So. 2d at 1154. Applying these
tests, the court held that employees had no reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to any of the information sought since the public has a right to know who is
working for it, when they are at work, and whether absences are for annual leave or
some other reason. Hatfield, 572 So. 2d at 593. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Edwards
argued that the individual employees' privacy interests outweighed the public's right to
know,. and that the employee records therefore should not be disclosed. Id. at 594.
30. 569 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990). Harrison, the petitioner in this case,
was convicted of forgery and other crimes. State v. Harrison, 505 So. 2d 783 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1987). That conviction had become "final" according to La. Code Crim.
P. art. 922, and plaintiff had begun serving his sentence. In an effort to secure post-
conviction relief from that sentence. Harrison sought to inspect and copy the records
compiled by the prosecution in his trial.
31. La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) (1982).
32. The district attorney successfully argued before the trial court that his records
19921
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However, not all documents sought are subject to public access,
nor will the courts always construe the statutory exceptions to disclosure
so narrowly. In a case demonstrating the limits of disclosure, Marine
Shale Processors, Inc. v. State of Louisiana, Department of Health
and Hospitals," the first circuit court of appeal refused a request by
Marine Shale Processors for disclosure of the data underlying a study
performed by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals which
examined the relationship between environmental conditions in St. Mary
Parish and the high incidence of neuroblastoma, a rare type of child-
hood cancer, in that community. Marine Shale sought access to the
data underlying that report, some of which was highly personal and
might have revealed the identities of the subjects of the study, 34 in
connection with pending litigation." Relying on both Louisiana Revised
Statutes 44:3(A)(7), which at the time exempted records relating to the
were not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act because his files pertained
to "criminal litigation" that was "pending" or "reasonably anticipated" under the
meaning of La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) (1982). Harrison, 569 So. 2d at 586. The second circuit
reversed, holding that an action for post-conviction relief was not "criminal litigation"
under the meaning of that exception to the Public Records Act. The court noted that
the Public Records Act must be interpreted liberally in favor of public access and that
the exceptions to access to public records must be "specific" and "unequivocal."
Harrison, 569 So. 2d at 587. Applying this standard, the court read La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1)
(1982) strictly according to its terms to exempt from disclosure only those prosecution
files which pertain "to pending criminal litigation or any criminal litigation which can
be reasonably anticipated, until such litigation has been finally adjudicated or otherwise
settled." Harrison, 564 So. 2d at 587 (emphasis in original). Because La. Code Crim.
P. art. 992 makes clear that the criminal litigation in this case was "fully adjudicated"
when Harrison exhausted all of his direct appeals and began serving his sentence, the
District Attorney's file was susceptible to inspection as a public record from that time,
for any purpose. Judge Sexton dissented, arguing that a convict's application for post
conviction relief constitutes "anticipated criminal litigation" under the meaning of the
Act.
As this article goes to press, the Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly approved
the holding and reasoning of Harrison. Lemmon v. Connick, 590 So. 2d 574 (La. 1991).
33. 572 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
34. The questions asked of the participants in the study included detailed inquiries
about the families' financial affairs, medical history, sexual habits and consumption of
drugs. Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 572
So. 2d at 282 n.l. After review, the court concluded that the information not already
released-such as the date of diagnosis, patient's age at diagnosis, sex, race, religion,
family medical history and the like-would all tend to reveal the identities of the
subjects of the study. Id. at 284.
35. Marine Shale brought these proceedings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1429,
which provides for perpetuation of evidence relevant to pending litigation. However,
in light of its resolution of the issue of privilege, the court did not find it necessary
to consider such procedural issues in any detail. Marine Shale, 572 So. 2d at 283.
[Vol. 52
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identities of participants in public health studies from disclosure,36 and
the state constitutional right of disclosural privacy,"' the court con-
cluded that the statutory language "creates a reasonable expectation
of privacy on the part of the participants in such a study that their
identities will in no manner be disclosed to the public . . ." and that
"the public's right to documents is outweighed by the public's interest
in having these studies performed, and that the statute exemption
appropriately compromises the former for the latter.""8
While the results in these cases may not be surprising, they are
noteworthy for the light they shed on the analytical process the courts
have used to determine the boundary line between the competing con-
stitutional values of public disclosure and personal privacy. Specifically,
while the multi-step analysis quoted above contemplates separate and
sequential analyses of the statutory and constitutional exceptions to
disclosure, some of the cases appear to show a convergence of those
two issues into a single one: whether the subject of the disclosure had
a "reasonable expectation" of non-disclosure under the circumstances.
For example, in Hatfield v. Bush, the court defined the operative scope
of the statutory exemption of personnel records, set forth in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 44:11, not by any appeal to the plain meaning or
legislative history of the statute, but rather by deciding whether a
public employee had any "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the
particular items of information at issue.39 Conversely, in Marine Shale,
the court similarly held that it was the statutory exemption from
disclosure of information tending to reveal the identities of participants
in public health investigations that created their constitutional "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy." '40 Such amalgamation of statutory and
constitutional standards raises interesting questions, both as to the
36. La. R.S. 44:3(A)(7) (1982) exempts disclosure of "records containing the identity
of a subject of a public health disease investigation or study or records which would
tend to reveal the identity of such a subject." This subsection was thereafter repealed
in its entirety. 1990 La. Acts No. 59, § 3.
37. Marine Shale, 572 So. 2d at 284, citing Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (construing article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 564 (1979).
38. Marine Shale, 572 So. 2d at 284. The court's reliance on the state constitution
as well as the statutory exception makes it appear that the court would have reached
the same result even had no explicit exemption been applicable. The constitutional right
of privacy, standing alone, apparently would have sufficed.
39. Hatfield v. Bush, 572 So. 2d 588, 593-94 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990), concluding
that public employees do not have such a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their
names, the dates they are absent from work, and whether those absences were for
annual leave, and that La. R.S. 44:11 therefore did not apply to those items of
information. In contrast, the court held that employees may have an expectation of
privacy as to whether absences were due to sick leave.
40. Marine Shale, 572 So. 2d at 280.
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conceptual soundness of the tendency toward combination of the two
inquiries and as to the real utility of the underlying concept of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy."
First, the combination of statutory and constitutional questions is
not logically compelled; the plain language of article XII, section 3
of the state constitution empowers the legislature to exempt from
disclosure any information it wishes, regardless of whether that in-
formation implicates any "privacy" interests. But where the legislature
has not been explicit, it is neither surprising nor inappropriate for the
courts to rely to some extent on jurisprudence developed to explicate
the constitutional right of privacy when interpreting the Public Records
Act. Certainly statutes should always be interpreted, where possible,
in such a way to avoid constitutional problems. A fortiori here, where
the constitutional values of openness and privacy necessarily compete,
the statute enacted to further one constitutional value must be inter-
preted in light of potentially conflicting values. However, the converse
is not necessarily true; the fact that a particular piece of information
does not raise constitutional privacy concerns does not necessarily mean
that the legislature intended that it be disclosed. Thus, while the use
made of the "reasonable expectation" standard appears to have been
appropriate in both Marine Shale and Hatfield v. Bush, courts should
be on guard against reductionism. The constitutional right of privacy
is one limit on disclosure under the Public Records Act, but it is not
the only limit that the legislature is entitled to impose.
A more fundamental problem is that the "reasonable expectation"
standard is a less than satisfactory analytical tool even for the limited
purpose of interpreting the state constitution. The standard was first
articulated by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States" as a guideline
for interpreting the search and seizure guarantee of the federal fourth
amendment, and thereafter was adopted as the standard for invoking
the implied federal constitutional right of disclosural privacy.' 2 In Webb
v. City of Shreveport, the Louisiana courts adopted that standard as
the measure of whether disclosures implicate the express state consti-
tutional guarantee of privacy.' As articulated in Katz and adopted in
41. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967). The Court, in a very influential opinion,
in which Justice Harlan concurred, held that a person has a protectable expectation
that his conversations on a public telephone will be private, and that warrantless tapping
of such conversations therefore violates the federal Fourth Amendment.
42. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 4"57-58, 97 S.
Ct. 2777, 2797-98 (1977), applying the Katz formulation to tentatively conclude that
former President Nixon did have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to his
official papers and tapes, which then was weighed against the public interest in disclosure
of those materials.
43. 371 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied. 374 So. 2d 657 (1979).
[Vol. 52
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Webb, an "expectation of privacy" must, in order to merit protection,
meet both subjective and objective tests: "a person [must] have ex-
hibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
... expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'" Regardless of any issue concerning the propriety of
reliance on a standard developed by the federal courts to regulate
searches and seizures to interpret the state constitution's express right
of privacy, it is clear that this standard is both circular and conclusory.
Certainly one's subjective "expectations" regarding one's privacy can
be powerfully altered by the state of the law-if one knows that certain
records are subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act, one
will no longer "expect" those records to be private. If the same
subjective expectation is then used to determine the application of the
same law, the circularity is obvious. Moreover, the "objective" aspect
of the test is conclusory; it tells nothing about how or why one might
conclude that a particular expectation is one which society considers
"reasonable. 43 And, as recent federal cases illustrate, the standard is
subject to manipulation to limit the protections afforded privacy rights.4
Nonetheless, despite its weaknesses as an analytical tool, the "rea-
sonable expectation" standard may be as good as any other form of
words to describe the balancing process that courts must employ when
constitutional interests in public disclosure and privacy come into con-
flict. The issue will be whether Louisiana courts can avoid the temp-
tation to follow the federal courts in their increasingly narrow
interpretations of that standard. Although the language of the test was
adopted from federal law, Louisiana courts should continue their in-
dependent interpretations of the line between the right of access to
public records and the right of privacy.
Other Decisions on Individual Rights: Of Due Process; Physical
Conditions; Privacy and Freedom of Speech
Last term's remaining individual rights cases also reached results
that were, if not surprising, at least noteworthy for their rejection of
novel claims based on state constitutional rights guarantees and their
reliance on federal law as a guide to interpretation of the state Dec-
laration of Rights.
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516.
45. These criticisms have been frequently made with respect to federal law. See,
e.g., Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583 (1989).
46. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979). See generally, Kitch, Katz v. United
States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 133 (1968).
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Article I, Section 2: No Due Process Protection for Abortion
Protestors
In State v. Aguillard,47 defendants convicted of criminal trespass
after demonstrations at an abortion clinic alleged that the trial court
erred by failing to credit their asserted defense of "justification in
defense of others." Defendants based their claims on article I, section
2 of the Louisiana Constitution, guaranteeing that no "person" shall
be deprived of life without due process;4 1 on the Louisiana Criminal
Code definition of "person" as "a human being from the moment of
fertilization and implantation; ' ' 9 and on the general criminal defenses
of "justification" and "defense of others." 0 Not surprisingly, the fifth
circuit court of appeal, like courts in other states confronted with
similar claims," rejected these arguments. The court noted that re-
gardless of any expressions of legislative disfavor, abortions were and
remain-at least under some circumstances-recognized as lawful under
Louisiana law 2 and protected by the paramount law of the federal
Constitution, 3 and concluded that prevention of lawful conduct cannot
constitute justification for criminal acts.
47. 567 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). The defendants were, in any event,
punished very leniently. They received only minor fines, most of which were suspended,
and six months of inactive probation.
48. La. Const. art. I, § 2.
Section 2. Due Process of Law
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process
of law.
49. La. R.S. 14:2(7) (1986) defines "person" for purposes of the Criminal Code
as follows:
(7) "Person" includes a human being from the moment of fertilization and
implantation and also includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or
not.
50. Codified at La. R.S. 14:18 and 14:22 (1986).
51. This issue was apparently res nova in Louisiana, but has been litigated in other
states. See, e.g., Allison v. City of Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991); State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1991): State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187
(Mo. App. 1989) (cited in Aguillard);. All courts considering arguments of the sort
raised by the defendants in Aguillard have unanimously rejected them.
52. At the time when Aguillard was decided, abortions in Louisiana were regulated
by statutes codified at La. R.S. 40:1299.31 (1977). As the Aguillard court noted, these
statues legalize abortions under some circumstances. State v. Aguillard, 567 So. 2d 674,
676 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Even the anti-abortion bill passed by the legislature last
summer would permit abortions in some cases involving rape, incest or danger to the
life of the mother. 1991 La. Acts No. 26, § 87(B), amending La. R.S. 14:87.
53. Aguillard, 567 So. 2d at 677, noting that in its most recent full statement on
the issue, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989), the United States Supreme Court once again left undisturbed the basic holding
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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Given its resolution, the court in Aguillard did not find it necessary
to decide explicitly on the merits of the defendants' claim that a fetus
should be considered a "person" under the meaning of section 2 of
the Louisiana Declaration of Rights., Should that question come before
the courts for resolution in the future, however, inquiry should focus
on what the framers and ratifiers of the current state constitution
meant by that term in 1974, not on retroactive application of any
subsequent enactment by the legislature.
Article I, Section 3: Alcoholism as "Physical Condition"
The year's most interesting equal protection case is chiefly note-
worthy for what the court declined to decide. In Shields v. City of
Shreveport,'4 the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of
police officers found drinking alcohol while on voluntary extra duty.
In doing so, the court's majority considered only whether the officers
were discharged in violation of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,"
and thus avoided an opportunity to clarify the meaning of the state
constitutional prohibition of arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable dis-
crimination on the basis of "physical condition.' ' 6 Justice Dennis,
54. 579 So. 2d 961 (La. 1991).
55. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985). prohibits
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating against
any individual on the basis of that individual's handicap. A person suffering from
alcoholism is considered a "handicapped individual" under the meaning of the Act
unless that person's "current use of alcohol ... prevents such individual from per-
forming the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such
current alcohol ... abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety
of others." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1985). Whitaker v. Board of Higher Education, 461
F. Supp. 99, 106 n.7 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) and authorities cited therein. The Shields majority
held that the Rehabilitation Act did not protect plaintiffs because they were fired as
a consequence of specific infractions rather than their status as alcoholics, and because
the Act protects only alcoholics whose problems are under control. 579 So. 2d at 966,
citing Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 591 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
109 S. Ct. 1402.
56. La. Const. art. I, § 3:
Section 3. Right to Individual Dignity
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime. (emphasis added.)
The constitutional prohibition on discrimination based on "physical condition" was
previously defined to include distinctions between individuals suffering relatively lesser
and relatively greater degrees of injury in medical malpractice cases. Sibley v. Board
of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108-09 (La. 1985).
1992]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 52
however, expressly considered the issue in dissent and concluded that
alcoholism does indeed constitute a handicap falling within the concept
of "physical condition" under the meaning of section 3. He concluded
that the discharge of the officers was invalid because the action resulted
from their alcoholism rather than because of any particular act, and
because the state failed affirmatively to show that discharge of the
offending officers-rather than rehabilitation or other possible sanc-
tions-reasonably furthered a legitimate governmental purpose."
In other decisions, courts in Louisiana upheld both Article 1732(6)
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which gives plaintiffs in
maritime cases brought in state court sole power to decide whether
trial will be before a judge or a jury,"8 and Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:5644, which extended the time to bring suits to recover for asbestos
abatement work, 9 from challenges based upon the equal protection
57. Shields, 579 So. 2d at 972-73. The requirement that the state bear the burden
of showing the reasonableness of its classification follows from the inclusion of "physical
condition" as an enumerated class in the third sentence of Section 3. Sibley, 477 So.
2d at 1107-08.
58. Sons v. Inland Marine Serv., Inc., 577 So. 2d 225, 229 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991), holding that since the statutory distinction between maritime and other cases did
not classify individuals by any of the characteristics specified in section 3, the burden
was on the challenger to demonstrate that it furthers no appropriate state interest. The
court found that the asserted state interests in conforming state admiralty procedure
to the processes of federal admiralty courts and in avoiding the costs of jury trials
constituted adequate reasons for the statute. In response to additional arguments, the
court reaffirmed its prior holding that "there is no due process right to a jury trial
under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974," and held that the requirement of section
22 of the state Declaration of Rights that "courts be open" for the vindication of
rights did not require the legislature to provide juries in those courts.
As this article goes to press, the Louisiana Supreme Court has limited the scope
of Article 1732(6), holding on statutory "plain meaning" rather than constitutional
grounds that the article does not apply when a plaintiff asserts Jones Act as well as
other maritime claims. Parker v. Rowan Cos., 591 So. 2d 349 (La. 1991).
59. Security Homestead Ass'n v. W.R. Grace & Co., 743 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. La.
1990). While the court was undoubtedly correct in holding that the time extension
violated neither the federal nor the state guarantees of equal protection, it erred in
concluding that "Louisiana's equal protection guarantee is intended only as a restatement
of the federal equal protection clause." As the Louisiana Supreme Court made clear
in Sibley, the guarantees of section 3 of the state Bill of Rights go beyond and must
be interpreted independently of the equal protection clause of the federal Fourteenth
Amendment. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1104-09 (La. 1985).
On a closely related question, the court also held that the asbestos abatement
revival statute did not constitute a "special law" prohibited by La. Const. art. Ill, §
12, because the "class" of defendants disadvantaged by the statute was reasonable and
proper based upon a valid legislative distinction between "immovable, contaminated
real properties where people work and sleep-and which present the greatest risk of
harmful exposure-and other types of transient personalty which might be contami-
nated." Security Homestead, 743 F. Supp. at 458-59. Finally, with respect to state and
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guarantee of section 3 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, as well
as on other grounds.
Article I, Section 5: Of Racetrack Workers, Obscenity Vendors
and the Persuasive Authority of Federal Cases
Regulations adopted by the Louisiana State Racing Commission
require virtually all persons holding licenses from that commission-
a broadly defined group that includes not only jockeys and trainers
but also office personnel and others whose jobs are not directly related
to actual horse racing-to submit to random suspicionless drug testing.w°
In Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Commission,6' the fourth circuit
court of appeal sustained those regulations against challenges based
on both the federal and Louisiana constitutions.6 1 In reaching this
conclusion with respect to the federal claims, the court relied on
Shoemaker v. Handel,63 a 1986 federal decision which held that because
of the long tradition of pervasive government regulation of horse racing
and the resulting "reduced ... justifiable privacy expectations" on
the part of those who directly participate in the sport, and because
of the state's legitimate interest in the integrity of the sport, New
Jersey horse racing regulations requiring random drug testing of "every
official, jockey, trainer and groom" did not violate the federal fourth
amendment." Turning to petitioner's state claims, the Holthus court
acknowledged that the right of privacy guaranteed by article I, section
5 of the Louisiana constitution is broader than its federal counterpart
but concluded, without explanation, that the reasoning of Shoemaker
applies to the state constitution as well.6'
Holthus is suspect in both its reasoning and its result. The Louisiana
regulation at issue in that case appears to be much broader in its
coverage than was the New Jersey regulation upheld in Shoemaker,
federal guarantees of due process, the court held that civil litigants have no fundamental
or "natural" right to the shelter of a prescriptive period, and that legislatures therefore
have full power to regulate when actions may be brought. Id. at 459-60.
60. The regulations are set forth at La. Admin. Code 35:1749 (1984), and quoted
by the court in Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 580 So. 2d 469 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1991).
61. 580 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
62. The state constitutional challenge was based on La. Const. art. 1, § 5, quoted
at supra note 4.
63. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 1141-43. The applicable New Jersey regulations are quoted id. at 1138-
39 n.2.
65. Holthus, 580 So. 2d at 471.
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or similar regulations upheld in other cases. 66 Moreover, post-Shoe-
maker decisions by the United States Supreme Court in Skinner v.
National Railway Labor Executives' Association6 and National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab" s indicate that such suspicionless
testing regimes will be held to violate the fourth amendment unless
the state demonstrates that testing those particular employees is nec-
essary in order to protect the safety of the public or to promote some
equally important public interest. 69 Judged by that standard, it is dif-
66. In addition to Shoemaker, see, e.g., Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir.
1991) (en banc, upholding against federal fourth amendment challenge an Illinois reg-
ulation requiring "jockeys and other participants in horse races" to submit to random
drug testing) and State v. Turcotte, 239 N.J. Super. 285, 571 A.2d 305 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (upholding regulation authorizing administrative searches of off-
track horse stabling facilities against fourth amendment challenge). Compare Serpas v.
Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1987) (warrantless searches of dormitories occupied by
racetrack "backstretchers" held to violate the fourth amendment); Hansen v. Illinois
Racing Board, 179 Il. App. 3d 353, 534 N.E.2d 658 (1989) (Racing Board rule purporting
to permit warrantless searches at racetracks held to violate the fourth amendment because
it failed to appropriately limit the discretion of the officers in deciding whether to
conduct the search).
67. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). In Skinner, the Court upheld federal
railroad administration regulations which required drug and alcohol tests of railroad
employees involved in serious railroad accidents, and otherwise authorized tests of an
employee where a supervisor has "reasonable suspicion," based upon specified factors,
that the particular employee is presently under the influence of drugs or alcohol on
the job. Id. at 609-11, 109 S. Ct. at 1408-10. The Court acknowledged that warrantless
searches are the exception rather than the rule, but noted that the railroad employees
at issue in Skinner were engaged in safety-sensitive tasks, and that the pervasive gov-
ernment regulation of the railroad industry did result in a diminished expectation of
privacy. Balancing the interests at stake, the Court held the regulations not unreasonable
Id. at 619-33, 109 S. Ct. at 1414-23.
68. 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). In Von Raab, the Court upheld regulations
requiring drug tests of all treasury employees who were directly involved in drug
enforcement and interdiction, who carried firearms, or who had access to classified
information. Using the balancing analysis employed in Skinner, the Court upheld the
regulations as they applied to the first two categories of employees, but remanded for
further proof regarding employees with access to classified information. The Court was
satisfied that the regulations were not so narrowly drawn as to affect only those
employees who had real access to sensitive data.
69. The Supreme Court's analyses in Skinner and Von Raab have been criticized
for placing insufficient emphasis on the narrow scope of the particular drug testing
programs in those cases, and thus unnecessarily broadening the "administrative search"
exception to the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment
Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 87 (1989). Nevertheless, it is
evident, both from the careful fact-specific balancing process that the Court employed
in both cases, and in particular from the partial remand of the regulations at issue in
Von Raab in order to narrow the range of employees on whom they would be imposed,
that the fourth amendment does not permit suspicionless drug testing regimes to be
imposed indiscriminately on employees who do not actually perform jobs that justify
such an imposition.
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ficult to see how the state could justify random testing of office
personnel or others not directly involved in the races.
In any event, regardless of the propriety of the Holthus court's
holding with respect to the fourth amendment, the assertion that Shoe-
maker also articulates the controlling standard under the Louisiana
state constitution appears to be unwarranted. As the fourth circuit
acknowledged, section 5 of the state Declaration of Rights provides
protections for privacy interests that go beyond those provided by the
federal Constitution. 0 While it is true that the state has a "vital interest
in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry which requires
close and constant supervision,"" that interest is certainly no greater
than the public safety interest inherent in suppression of drunken
driving that was held in State v. Church72 to be insufficient under the
state constitution to justify random suspicionless stops of drivers for
the purpose of administering sobriety tests. Particularly in light of the
apparent lack of proof of any close connection between drug testing
of all licensees and the state's interests in the safety of participants
and the integrity of the sport, the regulations at issue in Holthus
appear to be too broadly applicable to satisfy the rigorous standards
of section 5 as that section was interpreted in Church. 7
In State v. Honore,4 a separate decision also implicating section
5, the fifth circuit court of appeal upheld criminal prosecution of a
clerk at a bookstore which sold obscene magazines against challenges
based on the state constitutional guarantee of privacy, among other
grounds. 5 Like the fourth circuit in Holthus, the fifth circuit in Honore
70. Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 580 So. 2d 469, 471 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 470, quoting Pullin v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 484 So. 2d 105,
108 (La. 1986). Pullin upheld the suspension of a licensed owner and trainer of race
horses for violation of a racing rule banning prohibited animal drugs. Although the
court found that the search which produced the evidence of drug use was illegal, it
held that the evidence could be considered in the administrative license revocation
hearing.
72. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
73. Compare Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n,
403 Mass. 692, 532 N.E.2d 644 (1989), explicitly rejecting the analysis and results of
Shoemaker and holding that, regardless of what the federal Constitution might require,
suspicionless random drug testing of racetrack personnel violates the Massachusetts state
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
74. 564 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
75. In addition to the state constitutional privacy arguments discussed here, the
defendant in Honore also argued that she was the victim of selective prosecution, that
the statute criminalizing obscenity, La. R.S. 14:106 (1986), was void for vagueness, and
that the statute violated equal protection principles by providing an exception, in section
106(D), for "recognized and established" schools, churches, museums, and the like.
The court had no trouble rejecting the first two of these arguments. Honore, 564 So.
19921
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relied entirely on federal precedent construing the federal Constitution-
precedent which distinguishes between possession of obscene materials
in the privacy of one's own home, which is protected against criminal
prosecution on first amendment and privacy grounds,76 and sale or
donation of such materials to others, which is not7 7 -- to conclude that
the conduct at issue was also not protected by the Louisiana Declaration
of Rights.7 Here too, however, such reliance on federal precedent may
be unwarranted. While a thorough review of the drafting history and
judicial construction of the state guarantees of free speech and privacy
might show that the state constitution also embodies such a distinc-
tion,7 9 such a conclusion is not inevitable and, particularly in light of
the heightened protections available in this state by virtue of the state
constitution's explicit guarantee of privacy, should not be presumed
without independent analysis.80
2d at 348-49, and at 350-52, relying on State ex rel. Guste v. K-Mart Corp., 462 So.
2d 616, 620 (La. 1985); and State v. Louisiana Toy Co., 483 So. 2d 1264 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 686 (1986). As to the third argument, the court held,
as had several courts before it, that the offending "exceptions" section was severable
and that the remainder of the statute was enforceable. Honore, 564 So. 2d at 350,
citing State v. Luck, 353 So. 2d 225 (La. 1977) and State v. Freeman, 544 So. 2d 22
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
76. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969).
77. United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-
28, 93 S. Ct. 2665, 2667-69 (1973).
78. Honore, 564 So. 2d at 349-50. The Honore court's entire analysis consisted of
little more than a long quote from the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, which the fifth circuit held to be "the controlling
Louisiana law." Despite the differences in constitutional text-the Louisiana Declaration
of Rights expressly protects "privacy;" the federal constitution does not-the court
held that under the state constitution, as under the federal, "although one may have
the right to possess and view obscene material in the privacy of his home, this right
does not equate to a right to acquire the obscene material." Honore, 564 So. 2d at
350.
79. While a thorough review of the state constitutional materials is beyond the
scope of this article, it is worthy of note that the crucial federal case distinguishing
between the right to possess pornography and the right to obtain it, United States v.
Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, was decided by the United States Supreme Court in June of 1973,
while the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 was meeting and before the
present Constitution was either finally adopted by the Convention or ratified by the
voters. Thus, it could be argued that courts should at least presume, absent further
evidence, that the concept of "privacy" which the Louisiana drafters and ratifiers
intended to adopt in the state constitution included the rights articulated in Stanley
and the limitations imposed by United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels. Compare Devlin,
Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could Roe v.
Wade Be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La. L. Rev. 685, 709-14 (1991),
making a similar argument with respect to abortion rights under the Louisiana State
Constitution.
80. Other states confronted with similar questions have reached conflicting results.
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Article I, Section 7: Free Speech, Federal Law and Political
Dismissals of Government Employees
In Finkelstein v. Barthelemy," the fourth circuit court of appeal
dismissed claims brought by a former New Orleans Assistant City
Attorney, who alleged that he had been fired from that job for purely
political reasons.82 In a prior federal action arising out of the same
dispute, a federal district court had dismissed simiilar claims based on
the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal Constitution.83 The
attorney then brought the present action in state court, alleging that
the firing violated his rights under the Louisiana constitution.14 As the
state court noted, the question of whether political firings violate the
Some have concluded that the right to "possess" obscene material would be empty
without some correlative right to obtain it, and have therefore construed their respective
state constitutions to provide some protection for that correlative right of an adult to
obtain pornography. State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372 (Hawaii 1988) (relying on state
constitutional guarantee of privacy); State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987)
(relying on state guarantee of free speech). Others have reached the opposite result,
adopting a distinction similar to the one adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990); Commonwealth v. Stock, 346 Pa. Super.
60, 499 A.2d 308, 315 (1985).
81. 565 So. 2d 1098 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
82. The facts of the case are more fully set forth in the federal case. Finkelstein
alleged that he was fired because he was a Republican (Mayor Barthelemy is a Democrat),
because he refused to campaign for a tax proposal supported by the Mayor, and because
the Mayor wanted to give Finkelstein's job to another person as a reward for past
political support. Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 678 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. La. 1988).
In addition to the constitutional claims discussed here, plaintiff in the state action
also raised a claim under La. R.S. 23:961 (1985), which generally precludes employers
from interfering with the right of employees to engage in political activity. The fourth
circuit dismissed the claim, noting that neither the Mayor nor the City Attorney of
New Orleans was the "employer" of the plaintiff.
83. Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 678 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. La. 1988). The federal
court held that the attorney occupied a confidential or "policymaking" position under
the meaning of Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980) and Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) and that his federal constitutional rights
must therefore be balanced against and, in this case, subordinated to the local gov..
ernment's interest "as an employer in loyal, trustworthy and competent service." Fin.
kelstein, 678 F. Supp at 1259.
Although the plaintiff originally also raised his state constitutional claims in this
action, the federal court declined to decide them. Id. at 1267.
84. Apparently, plaintiff did not, in the state case, specify which state constitutional
provisions were at issue. The court considered whether political firings violated either
section 7 or section 3 of article I of the Louisiana Constitution. Section 3 is set forth
at supra note 56. Section 7 provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Freedom of Expression
No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press.
Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject,
but is responsible for abuse of that freedom.
1992)
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state guarantees of free expression or other rights was res nova in
Louisiana. But noting that the state constitutional provisions at issue
were "similar in nature" to their federal cognates, the fourth circuit
looked for guidance to the same decisions that had undergirded the
prior federal case. 5 Not surprisingly, it came to the same conclusion
as had the federal court, holding that "the position of Assistant City
Attorney falls within the Elrod/Branti exception as a policymaking
position," that the legitimate interest of the Mayor and City Attorney
"in promoting the efficiency of the services they perform for all
citizens" requires restricting the post of Assistant City Attorney to
those "who fully support the Administration's policies," and that such
considerations "far outweigh the appointee's interests in his right of
free speech." 86
Although the outcome in the case may be unexceptional, the fourth
circuit's assumption that the free speech provision of the state con-
stitution is coterminous with the federal Bill of Rights in this context
may, like the same court's decision in Holthus, be subject to debate.
To be sure, the argument in favor of conforming the interpretation
of the state constitution to current interpretations of the federal Con-
stitution is stronger with respect to section 7 than it is with respect
to section 5. The Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 rejected
the original committee draft of the state speech guarantee and sub-
stituted the present language in order to more closely follow the lan-
guage and then-current interpretations of the federal first amendment,8 7
and Delegate Burson, the proponent of the substitute language finally
adopted, did state that he believed that the state constitutional guar-
antees of free speech and press were areas of the law that should
"grow organically" by a process of case by case judicial decisionmaking
similar to that used to interpret the federal guarantee.88 Nevertheless,
the fact remains that Elrod v. Burns89, the federal case which for the
first time announced that the first amendment has any relevance to
patronage issues, was not decided until 1976, two years after the
Louisiana Constitution was adopted. Certainly nothing in the Con-
vention debates on section 7 appears to indicate that the state con-
85. Finkelstein, 565 So. 2d at 1101, citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.
Ct. 2673 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
86. Finkelstein, 565 So. 2d at 1101.
87. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts, 1107-1117, recording the debate on and adoption of the amendment pro-
posed by Delegate Burson. See generally, Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1974).
88. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts, 1108.
89. 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
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stitutional draftsmen anticipated that the federal first amendment would
in the future be interpreted in such a fashion. 90 It may be that the
state provision should be independently interpreted to confer rights
against patronage dismissals. But once again, such a finding should
be based on an independent analysis of the state constitution, not on
the mere assumption that the meaning of the state guarantees either
expands or contracts in "lock-step" with post-1974 changes in the
interpretation of the federal Constitution. 91
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND PRISONERS' RIOHTS
During the previous term, the Louisiana appellate courts issued a
number of noteworthy decisions regarding the state constitutional law
of criminal procedure and prisoners' rights. In the area of "search
and seizure" the courts upheld both warrantless questioning of children
present at a psychiatrist's office while that office was being searched 9"
90. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts, 1105-1127. The debate focused on more clearly speech-related issues such
as obscenity, defamation, and government licensing and control of certain mechanisms
of dissemination of information.
In any event, it is unlikely that the delegates would have been very concerned with
the problem of whether the state guarantee of free speech independently protects against
patronage dismissals, As Professor Murchison pointed out in this space some years ago,
the Elrod/Branti line of federal cases has always been of limited practical importance
in Louisiana, as most non-policy making positions in the state government are already
protected by the Civil Service provisions of the state constitution. Murchison, Local
Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1979-80, 41 La. L. Rev. 483, 502-03 (1981).
To be sure, Assistant City Attorneys such as Mr. Finkelstein are not protected by Civil
Service. But the overall problem of patronage dismissals is one which the drafters of
the 1974 constitution may well have thought they had already handled in a different
way.
91. See generally, Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of
Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived
From Federal Sources, 3 Emerg. Issues State Const. L. 195, 234-37 (1990), discussing
the problems inherent in interpreting state constitutional provisions in "lock-step" with
cognate federal guarantees.
92. In State v. Byrd, 568 So. 2d 554 (La. 1990), police questioned two small boys
who happened to be present at a psychiatrist's office when the police arrived to execute
a valid search warrant for those premises. Reversing the lower courts, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that evidence obtained from the questioning of the boys was
properly admitted in a criminal proceeding against the psychiatrist. Although article I.
section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution granted the defendant standing, as a "person
adversely affected," to raise the issue of whether the questioning of the children violated
their state constitutional rights, the court held on the merits that the questioning of
the children was proper. Because the children were not unlawfully detained, their
statements were not the product of an unlawful seizure. Moreover, questioning the
children in the absence of their parents did not, under these circumstances, violate State
ex. rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S. Ct. 722
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and strip searches of prisoners without probable cause.93 In other areas,
the last term featured noteworthy decisions squarely holding for the
first time that a mistrial improperly granted over defendant's objection
bars reprosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the state con-
stitution, 94 holding that where the state waits too long before making
a criminal sentence executory principles of fundamental fairness require
relief from incarceration," upholding the state's ability to compel hand-
writing exemplars, 96 reaffirming the right to retain out-of-state coun-
sel, 97 and criticizing a system of assignment of judges that allowed
prosecutors to "pick" judges in criminal cases. 9s
(1978). "The rationale of Dino is to protect a youth from his own inexperience and
lack of understanding in dealing with the police as a suspect in a crime, not to protect
defendants who have chosen juveniles as victims." Byrd, 568 So. 2d at 563 (emphasis
supplied).
93. In Fulford v. Regel, 582 So. 2d 981 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), the first circuit
held that prisoner strip searches without probable cause do not violate prisoners' rights.
Because the prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy, and because there is
a strong security interest at the penitentiary, reasonable strip searches are permissible,
even when conducted without probable cause. The court based its finding of a diminished
expectation of privacy for inmates on both federal and state precedents. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 545-46, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1877-78 (1979); State v. Patrick, 381 So. 2d
501, 503 (La. 1980).
94. State v. Encalarde, 579 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). After deliberating
for only slightly more than two hours, the jury hearing the case reported that it could
not reach a verdict. Over the defendant's objection, the trial judge declared a mistrial.
Since the mistrial was improperly granted, the double jeopardy provision of the Louisiana
Constitution, art. 1, § 15, barred reprosecution on the same charge. As the issue was
apparently res nova in Louisiana, the court of appeal followed federal precedents. See
U.S. v. Wright, 622 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315
(9th Cir. 1979); and Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978).
95. State v. Roberts, 568 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1990). Here the state waited six years
to make the defendant's jail sentence executory. The court held that "Idlue process
and fundamental fairness" required converting the remainder of the sentence to parole.
Id. at 1019, relying on federal and state cases including Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d
868 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Lanier
v. Williams, 361 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. N.C. 1973); and State v. Kline, 475 So. 2d 1093
(La. 1985).
96. State v. Fowler, 575 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991), denying an application
for a writ of certiorari. In dissent, Judge King argued that the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974 prevents a criminal defendant from being required to give evidence against
himself, and that a handwriting sample is testimonial or communicative in nature.
97. In State v. Roberts, 569 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), the defendant
was arrested on a charge of possession of a large quantity of marijuana. At the time
of arrest, the defendant was in Richland Parish en route to El Paso, Texas. At
arraignment, the defendant was represented by local counsel from West Monroe; shortly
thereafter, his attorney from El Paso filed a motion to enroll as counsel of record in
association with local counsel, according to La. R.S. 37:214 (1988). After waiting for
a year before ruling, the trial court ultimately declined to allow the Texas attorney to
enroll as counsel of record, although it did allow him to sit at the counsel table and
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Despite these varied cases, however, last term's most interesting
and potentially disturbing decision in the area of criminal procedure,
State v. Cage,9 was one which did not directly involve the Louisiana
State Constitution at all. Rather, in that case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court applied federal standards regarding "harmless error" to affirm
the conviction and capital sentence of a defendant despite deficient
jury instructions on the issue of "reasonable doubt." In other cases,
the Louisiana appellate courts continued to construe the provisions of
the Louisiana Constitution relevant to criminal procedure and defen-
dants' rights, with typically mixed results.
State v. Cage: Applying "Harmless Error" Analysis to Erroneous
Jury Instructions
Tommy Cage was tried by a jury on a charge of first degree
murder. He was convicted and sentenced to death. That conviction
and sentence were upheld by the Supreme Court of Louisiana'00 but
reversed by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the
instructions given to Cage's jury misstated the standards for "reason-
able doubt" in violation of the defendant's federal due process rights.' °0
The case was remanded to the Supreme Court of Louisiana "for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."' 02 On remand, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held, over vigorous dissents by Justices Den-
nis and Calogero, that the erroneous jury instructions were nonetheless
consult with the defendant's local counsel. On appeal, the second circuit reversed,
holding that because the request to enroll was not dilatory, the trial court's ruling was
reversible error per se, under both article I, section 13 of the state constitution and
La. R.S. 37:214 (1988). Roberts, 569 So. 2d at 674-76, also citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932).
98. In State v. Kimmel, 571 So. 2d 208 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), the court held
that the system of assigning judges for criminal trials in Calcasieu Parish was improper.
The system gave the prosecutor the ability to pick the judge who would be trying the
case, thus violating State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989) and State v. Payne,
556 So. 2d 47 (La. 1990). However, the court held the system was harmless error absent
any finding of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.
99. 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991).
100. State v. Cage, 554 So. 2d 39 (La. 1989). Defendant argued, among other things,
that the jury instructions on the issue of reasonable doubt were confusing and that
they erroneously overstated the degree of uncertainty required to acquit. The Louisiana
Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding that, while certain phrases used by
the judge may have had the effect complained of, the instructions as a whole would
have been understandable. Justice Dennis concurred in part and dissented in part.
101. Cage v. Louisiana, Ill S. Ct. 328 (1990). The Court found that the instructions
erred by defining "reasonable doubt" as "such doubt as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty," "actual substantial doubt," and the absence of "moral certainty."
102. Id. at 330.
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"harmless error," and once again affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence. 103
Justice Watson, writing for the majority, found that the jury
instructions on reasonable doubt constituted harmless error under the
analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California°'0 and recently substantially modified in Arizona v. Ful-
minante.'10 Applying the distinction drawn by Justice Rehnquist in
Fulminante, the majority in Cage concluded that the erroneous jury
instructions were not "structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism,"' 16 which would result in automatic reversal, but were
instead mere 'trial error'-error which occurred during the presen-
tation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine
whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'0 7
Applying this harmless error analysis, the court found that the evidence
of the defendant's guilt was so overwhelming that the state met its
burden of demonstrating that the error did not contribute to the
defendant's conviction. 08 In separate dissents, Justices Calogero and
103. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991).
104. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), In Chapman, the California Supreme Court
had held that a prosecutor's adverse comments on a defendant's failure to testify violated
his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights against self incrimination, but that the error
was harmless. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial errors
involving violation of federal constitutional rights cannot be held harmless unless the
reviewing court is satisfied "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
105. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). The defendant in Fulminante confessed to an informant,
under duress, that he had abducted, brutalized, and killed a young girl. He was
subsequently tried on murder charges, and the confession was introduced in evidence.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that admission of a coerced confession
violated the defendant's rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, but that
such a violation is a mere "trial error" subject to "harmless error" analysis. However,
after applying that analysis, the Court concluded that the admission of the coerced
confession was nonetheless reversible error in this particular case because the state failed
to establish that the defendant would have been convicted absent the coerced confession,
and that the error was therefore not "harmless."
106. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. at 1264-65. Examples of such "structural defects" in
criminal trials that would not be subject to harmless error analysis include "total"
deprivation of the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 88 S. Ct.
792 (1963) and judges who are not impartial, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct.
437 (1927).
107. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. at 1264.
108. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (La. 1991). The majority also found that
harmless error analysis was to be applied to the sentencing phase of the trial. The
court concluded that there was significant evidence for the jury to conclude that at
least one of the aggravating circumstances existed for imposition of the death penalty.
Id. at 1129. Justice Lemmon, concurring, emphasized the heavy burden that the gov-
ernment must carry in order to show that an error is harmless, but concluded that the
burden was carried in this case.
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Dennis sharply criticized both the majority's holding that erroneous
jury instructions are subject to harmless error analysis and its conclu-
sion that -the error was in fact harmless. Justice Calogero argued that
the United States Supreme Court would not hold that erroneous jury
instructions are subject to a Chapman analysis.'09 Justice Dennis's
dissent argued that a reasonable doubt instruction could never be
harmless," 0 and that an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction does
not fit the "trial error" category enunciated in Fulminante."' Both
dissenting justices also criticized the majority for, in effect, substituting
its own judgment for that of the jury."12
No doubt the most immediately striking aspect of Cage is its
surprising conclusion that a jury instruction that misstates an issue as
fundamental as the meaning of "reasonable doubt" can ever be con-
sidered harmless." 3 Equally important, however, is the question of the
potential impact of Cage on future application of the criminal rights
guarantees of the Louisiana Constitution. Given the posture of the
case, that impact is difficult to gauge. The underlying substantive error
at issue in Cage violated only the federal Constitution; no substantive
violation of the state constitution was at issue." 4 Thus, the court
properly applied federal rather than state law regarding the issue of
harmless error.' But the question remains whether the same analysis
109. Id. at 1130.
110. Citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979); Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100,
93 S. Ct. 354 (1972); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986); and
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983).
Ill. As noted above. "trial error," according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is an
error which (a) occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and (b) may
be evaluated quantitatively in the context of the other evidence presented. Justice Dennis
argued that because a jury instruction is not a part of the presentation of the case to
the jury, but rather is subsequent to the presentation of the case, an erroneous jury
instruction cannot be a "trial error"; it must therefore be considered a "structural
error." Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1134.
112. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1130, 1135.
113. As all justices acknowledged, the Louisiana court in Cage went beyond the
actual holdings of the applicable federal precedents; no decision by the United States
Supreme Court has yet squarely held that an erroneous jury instruction on the issue
of reasonable doubt can be considered harmless. Moreover, as Justice Dennis argued,
there is some reason to doubt that the Court would do so. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1130-
35.
t14. Cage argued on his direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court that the jury
instruction violated the substantive standards of the Louisiana as well as the federal
Constitution. Insofar as it relied on state law, that contention was conclusively rejected
by the Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Cage, 554 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. 1989).
115. "in deciding whether an error involving the denial of a federal constitutional
right can be held harmless in a state criminal case, the reviewing court must apply
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of harmless error would apply if the jury instructions had violated the
substantive standards of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, or if
some other state constitutional right had been violated.
If a substantive violation of the Louisiana Constitution had been
found, there is little reason to think that the recently broadened concept
of "harmless error," articulated by the Supreme Court in Fulminante
and applied in Cage, ought to be incorporated into Louisiana consti-
tutional law. First, as Justice Dennis pointed out in his dissent, pre-
Fulminante decisions by the Louisiana courts have uniformly held that
"harmless error" would be determined according to the stricter analysis
set forth in Chapman, and that jury instructions which violated the
substantive requirements of the state constitution would not be con-
sidered harmless error." 6 Moreover, as Justice Calogero pointed out
in his dissent, the state constitutional guarantees of the right to trial
by jury"7 and due process of law,"' like the state's statutory provisions
regarding jury instructions as to reasonable doubt," 9 provide an in-
dependent textual basis on which the state courts could rely to fashion
a separate and more rights-protective doctrine of harmless error for
Louisiana. The drafting history of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
reinforces the conclusion that the state courts should not apply Ful-
minante to violations of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights. While
it appears that the framers of the state constitution did not specifically
discuss the question of harmless error during their debates on the state
constitution, they did make it clear that the state constitutional guar-
federal law rather than state law." State v. Gibson, 391 So. 2d 421, 426 (La. 1980),
citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967).
Both Justices Calogero and Dennis, in their dissents, raised the question of whether
the state constitution provides more protection in this context than does the federal
Bill of Rights. As is argued below, the state constitution may well require a narrower
interpretation of "harmless error" in cases where a substantive state right is violated.
However where, as here, the only substantive right violated is a federal rather than a
state right, the same result probably should not obtain. The two questions of how a
criminal procedural right is substantively defined and whether a violation of that right
is subject to harmless error analysis are not wholly independent variables. The more
narrowly a right is defined - i.e., the more egregious the situations which will be
construed to be violations of that right must be - the more reasonable it would seem
to treat a violation of that right as always prejudicial, and vice versa. For these reasons
it would seem a form of illegitimate "bootstrapping" for a criminal defendant to rely
on one constitution to demonstrate that his rights have been violated, and on another
constitution to show that the error requires automatic reversal.
116. Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1137-38, citing, among other cases, State v. Vessell, 450
So. 2d 938 (La. 1984); State v. McDaniel, 410 So. 2d 754 (La. 1982); State v. Mack,
403 So. 2d 8 (La. 1981).
117. La. Const. art. I, § 17.
118. La. Const. art. I, § 2.
119. La. Code Crim. P. art. 804.
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antee of the right to a jury in criminal cases was intended to incorporate
then-existing federal precedents.2 0 Prior to the federal Court's recent
reinterpretation in Fulminante, federal law was clear that neither a
coerced confession nor an erroneous jury instruction would be subject
to harmless error analysis.'' As of 1974 the distinctions now drawn
by Chief Justice Rehnquist were not part of federal or Louisiana law;
rather, harmless error could only be found in accordance with the
narrow standards of Chapman, when the reviewing court could find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.' No different standard should apply to the state
constitution in the future.
STATE GOVERNMENT: STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS
During the past term, the appellate courts of Louisiana rendered
their normal quota of decisions regarding the staffing 2' and powers'2 4
of the state judiciary, review of administrative action,' " and the due
process rights of parties appearing before state administrative agen-
120. VII Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts 1184 (1977), reflecting the intent of the drafters that the criminal jury
guarantee of the state constitution track the substantive requirements of Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968), among other federal precedents.
121. Arizona v. Fulminante, III S. Ct. 1246, 1253-54 (1991) (White, J., dissenting
in part), and cases cited therein.
122. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967).
123. Williams v. Ragland, 567 So. 2d 63 (La. 1990), holding that provisions of the
state constitution exempting from mandatory retirement any judge "now sitting" who
has not yet had 20 years of service, applies to any judge taking office under the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, not just to those who were already in office on January
I, 1975, when that constitution came into force; Gamble v. White, 566 So. 2d 171
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1990), holding that La. Const. art. V, § 24 which requires that a
candidate for district judge "shall have been admitted to the practice of law in this
state for at least five years prior to his election" was not satisfied by a candidate who
had been suspended from the practice of law for two of the five years immediately
preceding the election.
124. Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), holding
that the court need not defer to the executive branch but rather has inherent authority
to appoint a liquidator ad hoc for an insolvent insurance company after the Insurance
Commissioner recused himself; Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1991), asserting jurisdiction over a custody battle even though one parent was a res-
ervation Indian.
125. Louisiana Chemical Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Quality, 577 So.
2d 230 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), holding that district courts hearing challenges to the
constitutionality of administrative regulations are normally confined to review of the
record, and that such review is sufficient under La. Const. art. V, § 16.
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cies.' 2' More importantly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rendered
two decisions further clarifying the respective roles of courts and ad-
ministrative adjudicators in the wake of Moore v. Roemer.1' In Mag-
nolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co.,125'the supreme court extended
the analysis of Moore, holding that, despite the exclusive statutory
authority given to the Commissioner of Conservation to order plugging
and abandonment of and to regulate seepage from oil wells, a mineral
lessor's action for damages from seepage is a civil matter under the
meaning of Moore, as to which district courts must have exclusive
original jurisdiction to find facts and award damages. Conversely, in
American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. Department of Environ-
mental Quality,'29 the court limited the reach of Moore, upholding
statutes vesting original jurisdiction to grant or deny waste disposal
or water discharge permits in the Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Quality, subject only to record review in the courts of
appeal.
Of all these decisions, however, the one which raised the most
basic issues of constitutional interpretation was the continuing battle
between former Insurance Commissioner Doug Green and the state
Board of Ethics for Elected Officials. In a revealing series of opinions
extending over the last two terms, this case graphically demonstrated
once again both the inherent difficulties confronting any court which
126. See, e.g., Gulf States Utilities v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n, 578 So. 2d
71 (La. 1991); Alliance for Affordable Energy, Inc. v. Council of the City of New
Orleans, 578 So. 2d 949 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Benoit v. Louisiana State Racing
Comm'n, 576 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); and Department of Public Safety
& Corrections v. Savoie, 569 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), all of which further
elaborate the principles announced in Allen v. State Board of Dentistry, 543 So. 2d
908 (La. 1989), regarding the due process rights of parties appearing before administrative
agencies.
127. 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990), holding that La. Const. art. V, § 16(A), which
expressly mandates that "district court[s] shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ...
matters," precluded the legislature from depriving district courts of the power to initially
determine workers' compensation claims and vesting that power in administrative hearing
officers instead. That decision was discussed in this space last year. Devlin, Louisiana
Constitutional Law. Developments in the Law, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 314-19 (1990).
Although the specific result of the Moore decision has since been overturned by con-
stitutional amendment, the legal principle announced in that case - that the consti-
tutional authority of the district courts places a limit on the ability of the legislature
to vest adjudicative functions in administrative agencies - remains an important element
in the law of the state.
128. 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991), upholding the district court's findings of fact and
assessment of damages, despite prior contrary findings of fact by the Commissioner.
On the issue of primary jurisdiction under state law, see generally Martin & Kramer,
Jurisdiction of Commission and Court: The Public Right/Private Right Distinction in
Oklahoma Law, 25 Tulsa L.J. 535 (1990).
129. 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991), reversing 580 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
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attempts to apply the classic doctrine of separation of powers to the
complexities of modern governance, and the special problems that state
courts face when they attempt to resolve such issues under state con-
stitutions by relying on conceptual categories and arguments derived
from federal cases construing the federal Constitution.
Federal Precedent and Separation of Powers: the State Board of
Ethics v. Green Cases
Former Insurance Commissioner Green was investigated by the
Louisiana Board of Ethics for Elected Officials. Although four of five
members of the Board are legislative appointees, 30 the Board is part
of the Louisiana Department of Civil Service and is clearly located
within the state's executive branch. The Board, which also acts as the
Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure, filed civil
proceedings against Green to collect civil penalties authorized by statute
for violations of the state Campaign Finance Disclosure Act.' Green
resisted on the ground that the enforcement system established by the
Act violated the state constitutional requirement of separation of pow-
ers by vesting the "executive" power to initiate prosecutions for viol-
ations of the Act in a Board composed of a majority of "legislative"
appointees. In its first opinion in the series, the Louisiana Supreme
Court relied on "formalist" federal precedents to affirm the lower
court and hold, by a bare four to three majority, that the statute
which authorized the Board to initiate civil proceedings was indeed
unconstitutional. 32 That opinion was thereafter vacated and the court
issued a second opinion, again by a bare majority, which relied on
more recent "functionalist" federal precedents to conclude that the
challenged Act did not violate the state constitution after all. 33 That
130. La. R.S. 42:1132(B)(1990).
131. The Campaign Finance Disclosure Act is codified at La. R.S. 18:1481 (1979).
Authorization for the Committee to file suit to collect penalties is found at La. R.S.
18:1511.5 (Supp. 1991).
132. State Through Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 545 So. 2d 1031, 1035-37 (La. 1989)
(opinion of then Judge Pike Hall, sitting by designation in place of Justice Lemmon,
joined by Justices Marcus, Watson, and Cole), extensively discussing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976). Briefly, "formalist" approaches to separation of
powers problems attempt to conceptually divide the functions of government according
to whether they are inherently "executive," "legislative," or "judicial" in nature, and
then assign that function exclusively to the appropriate branch. The Green opinion
noted above was vacated and the case set for rehearing after the return of Justice
Lemmon to active service. State Through Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 545 So. 2d 1031 (La.
1989).
133. State Through Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990) (opinion of
Justice Lemmon, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Calogero and Dennis),
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opinion was also vacated, only to be reinstated after the ascension of
the Louisiana Supreme Court's newest member. 3"
Despite the language of article II of the Louisiana Constitution,
which could be construed to mandate a formalist approach to separation
of powers issues in the state,' the supreme court was doubtless correct
in its conclusion that a less rigid, "functionalist" approach should be
applied to cases such as Green, in which the sole issue is whether
novel administrative arrangements may technically violate the concep-
tual distinctions between "executive" and "legislative" powers. As
scholars have long noted, the reality of modern governance precludes
too rigid an adherence to philosophical distinctions between legislative,
executive and judicial powers; effective administration often requires
that limited powers of more than one type be united in a single
administrative entity.'36 The Louisiana Supreme Court has at least
implicitly recognized this reality on several occasions, upholding in-
stitutional arrangements that appear to mix legislative and executive
following the analysis of and citing Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597
(1988). Briefly, "functionalist" approaches to separation of powers issues proceed by
emphasizing the inherently "mixed" nature of many government functions and the need
to maintain a relative balance between the three constitutional branches. Administrative
mechanisms mixing functions will ordinarily be ruled unconstitutional under this ap-
proach only if they threaten to "unbalance" that necessary balance among the con-
stitutional branches. This second opinion in Green was vacated after the retirement of
Chief Justice Dixon and the election of Judge Pike Hall, author of the original supreme
court opinion in the case, to take Chief Justice Dixon's place. State Through Bd. of
Ethics v. Green, 559 So. 2d 480 (La. 1990).
134. State Through Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990) (opinion of
Justice Lemmon, joined by Chief Justice Calogero and Justices Dennis and Hall), denying
rehearing and reinstating the opinion originally published at 559 So. 2d 480 (La. 1990),
reversing 540 So. 2d 1185 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989). Justice Hall's position on these
issues apparently changed between the time he authored the court's original "formalist"
opinion and his eventual joining in the court's final "functionalist" opinion.
135. Article 11 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 contains only two sections.
which provide as follows:
Section 1. Three Branches
Section 1. The Powers of the government of the state are divided into three
separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.
Section 2. Limitations on Each Branch
Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of
these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise
power belonging to either of the others.
136. Most of the analysis in this area has been directed to federal administration.
See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984); Pierce, Morrison v. Olson, Separation
of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4-6 (1988). The
point is, however, equally applicable to administration on the state level.
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
functions to some degree.' 3' Certainly in a situation such as was present
in Green, where the actual mechanism by which the members of the
Board of Ethics for Elected Officials were appointed precluded any
real concern that they would be subject to control by the legislators
who appointed them,'38 there is little practical reason to elevate con-
stitutional form over substance and insist on a hermetic separation of
legislative and executive roles.
Beyond its results, however, the remarkable point about the Green
case is the extent to Which all opinions in the case rely on opposing
federal constitutional precedents to support their opposing interpre-
tations of the- requirement of separation of powers under the state
constitution. On one level, this reliance is understandable. The recent
separation of powers decisions by the United States Supreme Court
comprise an extensive and well developed, if somewhat self-contradic-
tory, body of precedents which reach generally workable solutions to
the very difficult problem of conforming Montesquieu's vision of sep-
arated powers to the real world complications of the administrative
state. However, such reliance is suspect, for multiple reasons of con-
stitutional theory, text and policy.
As a matter of basic theory it is noteworthy that, unlike the federal
Constitution, state constitutions do not grant power, but rather merely
allocate pre-existing sovereign powers."39 Thus, unlike their federal
counterparts, the branches of state government are not limited to any
listing of enumerated powers. Moreover, the framers of the federal
Constitution created the Presidency as a "unitary executive," making
all executive-type powers responsive to a single will. 40 In contrast, the
137. See, e.g., Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987)
(upholding legislation delegating to the governor the essentially "legislative" power to
withhold and transfer appropriated funds); State ex rel. Guste v. Legislative Budget
Comm., 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1977) (upholding arrangement which allowed the governor
to appoint 24 out of 28 members of the powerful Legislative Budget Committee). These
cases could be distinguished from Green on the ground that the prior cases arguably
involved executive encroachment on legislative powers, while Green involved an alleged
legislative encroachment of executive power. However, there does not appear to be
anything in the doctrine of separation of powers that would justify such a unidirectional
approach to its application.
138. As the Green court noted, the members of the Board are appointed for staggered
six-year terms and can be removed only for cause. Legislators, legislative employees
and other public employees are ineligible for appointment. Green, 566 So. 2d at 625-
26.
139. The point has long been recognized as a basic distinction between state and
federal constitutional law. See, e.g., T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Lim-
itations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union
10-11 (5th ed. 1883).
140. Article 11, section 1 of the United States Constitution clearly provides that the
entirety of the federal executive power "shall be vested in" the President and the
President alone.
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Louisiana Constitution provides for several independently elected state-
wide executive officers,14 1 thus diffusing executive power. With respect
to texts, it is clear that while article II of the Louisiana Constitution
contains much stronger language purporting to forbid commingling of
powers than does the federal Constitution, 41 the state constitution also
contains many provisions expressly authorizing far more overt mixing
of executive and legislative powers than would be permitted under the
federal Constitution. 14 Finally, on the level of public policy, it is clear
that the pragmatic concerns underlying the doctrine of separation of
powers are far different for state governments than for the national
government. Separation of federal government powers serves as a useful
and necessary safeguard against. tyranny. However, in light of the much
more limited coercive powers of state governments and the effective
safeguards of liberty provided by federal law and institutions, such
concerns are much less realistic and should be much less important
with respect to individual states. On the contrary, when analyzing
separation of powers issues under state constitutions, such pragmatic
concerns as the desire for efficiency and reduction of the opportunities
for corruption should probably be most salient.
Full development of a separation of powers analysis applicable to
state constitutions is beyond the scope of this note. However, in light
of the structural, textual, and policy differences between the federal
Constitution and state constitutions with respect to the issue of sep-
aration of powers, federal precedents are of only dubious value in
evaluating such claims.
141. See, e.g., La. Const art. IV, § 3(A) providing for separate statewide elections
for the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General,
Treasurer, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Insurance, Superintendent of
Education, and Commissioner of Elections. Each of these constitutional officers is
separately allocated specific and independent executive powers by the state constitution.
La. Const. art. IV, §§ 5-12.
142. La. Const. art. II, quoted at supra note 135. While the federal Constitution
contains language specifically allocating the federal legislative, executive, and judicial
powers respectively in the federal Congress, President, and courts, U.S. Const. art I,
§ I. art. It, § I and art. Ill, § I, it contains no expressly prohibitory language like
that is found in the Louisiana constitution.
143. See, e.g., La. Const. art. IV, § 5(G), granting the governor an item veto over
appropriations bills.
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